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CANTARERO

RELIGION IN THE WRITING: A LITERARY ANALYSIS OF
JUSTICE KENNEDY ON ABORTION
BY JONATHAN CANTARERO*
INTRODUCTION
This article considers the link between religion and rhetoric in
the writing style of Former Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy.
During his thirty years on the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy, a lifelong Catholic, earned a reputation as the pivotal “swing vote” on morally-charged cases, particularly those involving abortion.1 Given that
Justice Kennedy often wrote the majority or concurring opinion in these
cases,2 it is worth considering whether, and to what extent, his religious
views shaped his legal analysis in authoring those landmark opinions.
To that end, Part I of this article lays out Justice Kennedy’s Catholic background leading up to his Supreme Court confirmation in 1987.3
Part II surveys three analytic theories set forth in Anthony Amsterdam’s
and Jerome Burner’s influential work Minding the Law.4 Calling for a
heightened consciousness about how judicial decisions are made, their
book explores judicial texts through the lens of categories, narrative,
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1
As Justice Kennedy’s former colleague, Justice Elena Kagan has observed, “It is absolutely
true that in some number of cases every year . . . . we are going to split on pretty predictable
lines. Four of us who think one thing and four of us who think the other thing and [then] we
wait and see what Justice Kennedy does.” Inside the Supreme Court (C-SPAN broadcast Nov.
4, 2014) https://www.c-span.org/video/?322869-1/discussion-supreme-court-justice-elena-kagan (00:37:43). Examples of opinions authored by Justice Kennedy and decided by split decision include: Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Same-sex Discrimination); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Abortion Rights; co-authored with Justice
Souter and Justice O’Connor); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (Death Penalty); Town
of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) (Religion and the Establishment Clause), and
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) (Same-sex Marriage); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE:
INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 327–29 (2007); BARBARA A. PERRY, THE
SUPREMES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 70–71 (2nd ed. 2009).
2
PERRY, supra note 1, at 68–71.
3
See infra Part I.
4
See infra Part II.
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rhetoric, and culture.5 Parts III–V draw from these categories in reviewing three landmark opinions by Kennedy on abortion: Akron, Casey, and
Carhart.6 The article ends with a few tentative conclusions on the degree
to which Justice Kennedy’s religious views may have shaped his judicial writing style and, thus, the nation’s abortion jurisprudence.7
I. JUSTICE KENNEDY
Despite the well-known fact that Justice Kennedy identifies as
Catholic,8 surprisingly little has been written about his particular religious beliefs.9 Even scholars who acknowledge this deficiency in the
literature decline attempts at constructing Kennedy’s theology,10 preferring instead to assess his opinions against traditional Catholic doctrine.11
Justice Kennedy himself has never openly espoused his specific religious views nor has he written an autobiography detailing them.12 Notwithstanding these limitations, a basic framework is still possible using
currently available sources.
Justice Kennedy was raised in a Roman Catholic household in
Sacramento, California, and eventually served as an altar boy at a local
church during his adolescent years.13 Nothing indicates that Kennedy
abandoned, or even considered leaving, the Church at any point before

5

ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 1–16 (2000). Although
Minding the Law considers four separate literary theories, this article focuses on the first three:
Categories, narrative, and rhetoric.
6
See infra Part III–V.
7
See infra Conclusion.
8
See Anthony M. Kennedy, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony_m_kennedy (last
visited Apr. 5, 2020).
9
Anne Jelliff, Catholic Values, Human Dignity, and the Moral Law in the United States Supreme Court: Justice Anthony Kennedy’s Approach to the Constitution, 76 ALB. L. REV. 335,
336 (2013) (“One aspect of Kennedy, which has been insufficiently discussed, is his Roman
Catholic faith and the influence that the teachings of the Catholic Church have had on his jurisprudence”).
10
Id. at 336.
11
See, e.g., FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY
MEANING OF LIBERTY 31-35 (2009) (viewing Kennedy’s jurisprudence as being informed by
post-Vatican-II documents such as Dignitatis Humanae, but limiting discussion as to Kennedy’s
actual religious beliefs to a footnote).
12
The uncertainty of Justice Kennedy’s personal views have likewise extended to his judicial
philosophy. TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 327 (“Kennedy had come to have a usually predictable,
if intellectually incoherent, collection of views. He believed what he believed, but it was hard
to say why”).
13
PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHOSE
CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION 413 (2006); PERRY, supra note 1, at
60.
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he began his legal career.14 Indeed, as Supreme Court commentator Jeffrey Toobin has noted, Kennedy was, and remains, “a serious Catholic,
of pre-Vatican II vintage” and one “who went to Mass every Sunday.”15
Kennedy’s Catholic upbringing quickly became the subject of
public inquiry following his nomination to the Supreme Court in 1987,
when scrutiny into his personal views heightened.16 At the time, President Ronald Reagan, who had nominated Kennedy to replace Justice
Lewis Powell, sought to assure Republicans that Kennedy was “a true
conservative” who would vote “right” (pun intended) on important
moral issues.17 Others, however, observed that while Kennedy was an
open member of the Roman Catholic Church, “his personal views on
those issues could not be readily determined.”18 Thus, more often than
not, Justice Kennedy was labeled a moderate conservative and a restrained pragmatist which, when coupled with this “courteous” and polite nature, led many to consider him a “conservative but not a rightwing ideologue.”19
Further efforts to relate Kennedy’s religious views to his moral
character can be gleaned from the 1987 confirmation hearings.20 Interestingly, the hearings only provide two references to Kennedy’s Catholicism and its potential impact on his judicial reasoning. Victor Fazio,
then a representative from California, was the first to reference Kennedy’s Catholicism, portraying his parish involvement as an example of
community engagement, and likewise, of good moral character.21 This
remark, however, was limited to one sentence and was later undermined
by a second reference provided by The National Abortion Rights Action
League (NARAL).22 Writing for the organization, then-executive direc-

14

See e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 53 (describing Kennedy’s devout Catholic belief).
TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 53.
16
Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 90 (testimony of
Anthony M. Kennedy), 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League)
(1987) [hereinafter Hearings].
17
Jelliff, supra note 9, at 335.
18
Robert Reinhold, Restrained Pragmatist-Anthony McLeod Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
1987),
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/12/us/man-in-the-news-restrained-pragmatist-anthony-m-kennedy.html.
19
Id. (quoting Professor Robert A. Horn, Kennedy’s professor during his undergraduate years
at Stanford).
20
Hearings, supra note 16, at 90 (testimony of Anthony M. Kennedy), 1091 (testimony of The
National Abortion Rights Action League).
21
Id. at 12 (testimony of Rep. Vic Fazio).
22
Id. at 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League); see id. at 12 (testimony of Rep. Vic Fazio).
15
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tor Kate Michelman cautioned that Kennedy’s religious ties could influence his decision-making in controversial cases–particularly those relating to woman’s rights.23 Although Michelman declined to question
Kennedy’s sincerity when he testified before Congress that he had “no
set agenda” with respect to abortion rights, she warned “that there may
nonetheless be significance in Kennedy’s history of pro bono work for
the Catholic Church.”24
Ultimately, these concerns proved to be remarkably insignificant
as Kennedy went on to be confirmed by a vote of 97-to-0, a consensus
reached in only four out of the last twenty-five confirmation hearings
since 1969.25 Indeed, this rare bi-partisan harmony would end up foreshadowing Kennedy’s future place on the Supreme Court as a consistent
moderate. Here, President Reagan’s expectation that Kennedy would remain a “true conservative” would certainly diminish over time as Kennedy slowly established himself as a “swing vote” in pivotal cases.26
Given this background, and recognizing Kennedy’s own reluctance to articulate his personal religious beliefs, this article assumes for
purposes of the foregoing analysis that Kennedy’s religious views have
more or less remained in accordance with traditional Catholic doctrine.27
The notion, for example, that Kennedy was and remains personally
against abortion is strongly suggested not only through some of his earliest opinions on the Court,28 but by various investigative reports as
well.29 Kennedy himself alluded to this immediately before Ohio v. Akron Center was decided, when, in a handwritten letter to Justice Blackman, he confessed that he was “still struggling with the whole abortion

23

Id. at 1084, 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League).
Id. at 1091 (testimony of The National Abortion Rights Action League).
25
See Supreme Court Nominations (Present-1789), UNITED STATES SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/nominations/SupremeCourtNominations1789present.htm
(last visited Apr. 6, 2020); see also IRONS, supra note 13, at 553.
26
See Jelliff, supra note 9, at 335; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 31–35.
28
See generally Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Kennedy writing the majority).
29
See, e.g., TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 53. As one book noted:
…[Kennedy] prayed in the old- fashioned manner, hands clasped before him. Abortion repelled him. He fully adopted his church’s teachings on the subject. Once before he joined the
Court, he had called Roe the “Dred Scott of our time,” a reference to the infamous 1857 ruling
that sanctioned slavery and helped spark the Civil War.
24
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issue.”30 Indeed, as we shall see, Kennedy subtly suggested his adherence to a more conservative moral stance in cloaked sections of Casey
and Carhart as well.31
II. ANALYTIC THEORIES
In order to properly analyze Justice Kennedy’s abortion jurisprudence, Part II of this article provides three analytic approaches to
reading judicial opinions, as adopted from Amsterdam’s and Burner’s
Minding the Law.32 In particular, this section discusses the analysis of
judicial opinions through the lens of category, narrative, and rhetoric.33
Category: The first approach, judicial opinions as category,
views such opinions as thematic products designed to persuade a particular audience.34 In that sense, judges frame their cases to fit within an
identifiable category or theme in order to tap into a reader’s cognitive
assumptions and intuitions about those types of subject matter.35 Thus,
under this view, a reader’s willingness to adopt a judge’s position on a
particular case hinges on the judge’s ability to engage the reader in a
relatable narrative. Amsterdam and Bruner suggest that, within the context of judicial opinions, three types of categories are most prevalent:
“natural theoretical,” “human narrative,” and “supernatural religious.”36
An opinion which fits in the “natural theoretical” category is
both fact-based and empirical.37 It is “natural” because it is based on
plain observations. It is “theoretical” because it requires a way of rationalizing those observations. The category is also “fact-based” because
the “theory” or “narrative” used must be “verifiable or at least falsifiable.” 38 This empirical approach, while perhaps “dry” in its substance, is
meant to create an account of the facts which, when analyzed under the
applicable law, creates an irrefutable logic-based proof (i.e., if you have
30

See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 46 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.)).
31
See infra Part IV–V.
32
See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
33
See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 1–16. A fourth approach, judicial texts as
culture, is also considered in chapters 8–9 but is not discussed here.
34
Marie-Claire Belleau & Rebecca Johnson, I Beg to Differ: Interdisciplinary Questions
About Law, Language, and Dissent, in LAW, MYSTERY & THE HUMANITIES: COLLECTED
ESSAYS 145, 146–47 (Logan Atkinson & Diana Majury eds., 2008).
35
See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 31–32.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 29–30.
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X then you can prove Y; facts A, B, and C clearly show X, therefore Y
must have occurred).
The second category, “human narrative,” on the other hand, is
based not on objective truth, but rather the appearance of truth.39 Here,
the judge writes an opinion by constructing a factual narrative that fits
within one of society’s “stock stories” (i.e., the “the evil corporation” or
the “innocent bystander”). 40 In that lens, the degree to which a judge
can successfully mimic these “stock stories” correlates with the reader’s
receptiveness of the case to his or her own experiences, biases, and conceptions of right and wrong. But while this fabricated familiarity may
make it easier to accept the judge’s version of the case, the approach can
easily turn into an argumentum ad passiones, or a mere “appeal to emotion.”41
Finally, where the category is “religious supernatural,” the judge
seeks to construct a “normative-religious” account of the facts.42 Here,
“normative” means ordinary everyday facts backed up by an assumed
understanding of some higher order.43 Thus, authority is not based on
verification (i.e., “natural theoretical”) or verisimilitude (i.e., “human
narrative”), but on the author’s capacity “to enlist belief as an act of
faith.”44 As Amsterdam and Bruner note, an opinion within this category
typically sets the tone as one of “human origins, human destiny, human
responsibilities, and human plight.”45 Of course, these are the “big questions” that the reader is least likely to understand. Accordingly, the resulting expectation is that the reader will simply defer to the judge’s
wisdom rather than rely on his or her own limited understanding of what
may be essentially a metaphysical issue.46
Notably, the potential to use the “religious supernatural” category seems particularly apparent in cases where religion is the issue or
where the author is religiously observant. Because the foremost concern
in this article is the interplay between personal religious views and legal
reasoning, Kennedy’s opinions provide fertile ground to explore this
type of category.

39

See BELLEAU & JOHNSON, supra note 34, at 147.
Id. at 153.
41
Michael C. Labossiere, Fallacy: Appeal to Emotion, THE NIZKOR PROJECT (1995),
http://www.nizkor.com/features/fallacies/.
42
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
40
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Narrative: A second analytical approach views judicial texts
purely as narrative. Amsterdam and Bruner provide the following definition:
A narrative can purport to be either a fiction or real account of
events; it does not have to specify which. It needs a cast of human-like
characters, being capable or willing their own actions, forming intentions, holding beliefs, having feelings. It also needs a plot with a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which particular characters are involved
in particular events. The unfolding of the plot requires (implicitly or explicitly):
(1) an initial steady state grounded in the legitimate ordinariness
of things
(2) that gets disrupted by a Trouble consisting of circumstances
attributable to human agency or susceptible to change by human intervention,
(3) in turn evoking efforts at redress or transformation, which
succeed or fail,
(4) so that the old steady state is restored or a new (transformed)
steady state is created,
(5) and the story concludes by drawing the then-and-there of the
tale that has been told into the here-and-now of the telling through some
coda…[such as a moral of the story].47
Unsurprisingly, then, although categories and narrative may cut
across each other and even masquerade as one another at times, narrative generally functions as the larger scheme while utilizing categories
to help paint the picture.48 Narratives work best in cases where the litigants are real people (i.e., in a murder case) as opposed to large corporations (i.e., in an anti-trust case) because the facts more easily translate
into a compelling “storyline.” Thus, a judge may write for the majority
utilizing a particular narrative (i.e., religion holds a special status in our
country so Mean Principle Mike should not prevent Happy Student Harold from forming an after school Jewish Club) by employing various
categories (i.e., the ill-spirited atheist [human-narrative] or religion as
sacred [religious-supernatural]).
The larger task of developing a narrative, likewise, requires a
particularized articulation of the “facts of the case.” Consequently, a
method that reads judicial opinions as narrative seeks to understand a
judge’s recitation of the “relevant facts” as influenced, if not dictated,

47

AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,

48

Id. at 12.

supra note 5, at 113–14.
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by the particular narrative employed. 49 What the facts “really” are and
how they are applied thereby hinge on the narrative an author seeks to
develop.50 This art of constructing a narrative brings us to our final approach to reading judicial text, rhetoric.
Rhetoric: Rhetoric, generally construed, “. . .denote[s] the various linguistic processes by which a speaker can create, address, avoid,
or shape issues. . .”51 Rhetorical discourse can likewise be interpreted
“. . .as seeking to regulate an audience’s conception of a subject and its
definition of the issues attending that subject.”52 In other words, it is the
craft of persuasion. Engaging in rhetorical discourse requires a speaker
to choose words to the exclusion of alternatives in order convey precisely that which they hope to communicate.53 This reality resonates
with Amsterdam and Bruner’s axiomatic statement that “. . . what is said
to be meant by what is said depends on what is perceived to be going
on.”54 Put differently: context matters.
The founder of analytical jurisprudence, John Austin, distinguished three dimensions of linguistic expression that helps illustrate
this point: the locutionary dimension, the illocutionary dimension, and
the perlocutionary dimension.55 As interpreted by Amsterdam and
Bruner, “the locutionary dimension is the propositional content of [any]
utterance consisting,” in its simplest form, “of a reference to some subject . . . and a predication about that subject.”56 Thus, in the statement
“He just applied for a job at McDonalds,” “He” functions as the subject
while “just applied for job at McDonalds” serves as the predicate.
The illocutionary dimension, on the other hand, refers to what
the speaker is doing with the utterance.57 This can range from merely
“stating,” “describing,” and “asserting” to “warning,” “questioning,” or

49

Id. at 111; see also Jerome Bruner, What Is A Narrative Fact?, 560 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 17, 18 (1998).
50
Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 381, 387 (1989).
51
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 165.
52
EDWIN BLACK, RHETORICAL QUESTIONS: STUDIES OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE 153 (1992).
53
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY 29 (2003) (“ observing that the rhetorical approach belongs to the tradition of the ancient sophists, who were
‘not interested in discovering truth’ but instead in ‘crafting persuasive appeals to the imperfect
understanding, the opinions and even the prejudices, of particular audiences’”); Anthony T.
Kronman, Rhetoric, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 677 (1999) (“Rhetoric is the art of persuading people to
believe things”); John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation-Part i: Classicial Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83 (1993).
54
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 167.
55
Id.; J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 108–09 (1962).
56
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 167.
57
Id.
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“commanding.”58 In the example above, the utterance appears to function as a mere “statement” but could easily change to a “question” (if
someone had asked where Mark was) or a warning (if someone said they
were referring Mark for a job at Wendy’s).
Finally, the perlocutionary dimension refers to the effects of the
utterance on the intended audience and hinges both on context and the
illocutionary dimension previously discussed.59 Take, for example, the
following exchange:
Listener: I just took the same Bar Exam as you and Mark, did
you think it was tough?
Speaker: He just applied for a job at McDonalds.
Here, the speaker’s fundamental objective is to answer the listener’s question although not necessarily in the most direct manner. The
illocutionary intention of the utterance is, apparently, to warn or scare
the listener while the perlocutionary consequence is likely that the listener is now “concerned,” “intimidated,” or even “frightened” by the bar
exam. The lesson here is that listeners and readers are often not given
the most straightforward response to a question or comment. In other
words, what the speaker “means” is not always readily ascertainable
from a mere locutionary understanding of the utterance but requires
some internal processing on the part of the listener or reader to “make
sense” of the utterance. This, however, does not necessarily make such
rhetorical utterances any more difficult to understand. On the contrary,
such responses often function as psychologically appealing short-cuts
for conveying information in a more vivid manner. Thus, with respect
to the last example:
Utterance: “He just applied for a job at McDonalds”
Translation: “The test was so difficult that not only had Mark
lost all hope of passing it and being admitted to the bar but his selfesteem was so low despite his educational background that he felt he
was only qualified to work for minimum wage in a fast-food restaurant.”
Rhetoricians take advantage of our innate ability to process information through inferences and implications by employing various
rhetorical devices disguised in ordinary language.60 In a legal setting,
and in particular in the context of judicial writing, this translates to a
system in which the illocutionary dimension of legal discourse (what
judges are doing when they write a particular passage in an opinion)

58
59
60

See id
Id. at 168.
See supra text accompanying notes 51–59.
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functions as a means for advancing their perlocutionary aim of persuading their audience to accept the written rationale for the outcome of any
given case. In simpler terms, a judge’s skill is “[knowing] how to say
something without thereby taking the responsibility of having said it,”
in order to reap the full benefits of “the efficacy of speech and the innocence of silence.”61 Given that countless rhetorical devices exist, we will
focus on two classifications highlighted by Amsterdam and Bruner: Ontological construction techniques and epistemological construction
techniques.62
Ontology is “a branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature
and relations of being.”63 Ontological construction techniques, thus,
serve to alter or modify our conception of reality.64 An example of this
is the “framing” that takes place in the first few paragraphs of all judicial
opinions. It is here where judges often set the tone that supports the reasoning that follows. Take, for instance, a criminal appeal in which the
judge rules in favor of the defendant. No matter how gruesome or colorful the facts, if the judge frames the case in a procedural context, refers
to the parties formally as “the people” and “the defendant,” and recites
facts in board strokes rather than in gory detail, readers will have a
harder time sympathizing with the victims. Why? Because in writing the
opinion this way the judge forces the reader to subconsciously depersonalize the parties and become increasingly emotionally detached.
Here, subtle changes in language, such as adding “allegedly” before otherwise damning facts and using ultra-technical jargon, all serve to divert
the reader from “reading in” a gruesome narrative that would convince
any twelve-person jury of a defendant’s guilt.
Related to, but distinct from, ontology is epistemology which
focuses on “the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity.”65 Unsurprisingly, then, epistemological
construction techniques work to alter the certainty or scope of our
knowledge of reality by “mak[ing] facts appear more or less certain and

61

Id. at 175, 382–83 n. 24 (citing

OSWALD DUCROT, DIRE ET NE PAS DIRE: PRINCIPES DE

SEMANTIQUE LINQUISTIQUE 12 (1972)).
62

See id. at 177. Minding the Law also includes a third (“story telling”) and fourth (“catch-all”)
category. See id. We considered the “story telling technique” in discussing the second analytical
approach, judicial texts as narrative, see, supra text accompanying notes 37-40, and will borrow
from “catch-all” category during our analysis of Kennedy’s opinions, see infra at Part III.
63
Ontology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ontology (last visited Apr. 7, 2020).
64
AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 177.
65
Epistemology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/epistemology (last visited Apr. 7, 2020) (emphasis added).
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[opening or closing] the range of admissible interpretative possibilities.”66
One example of this is to include questioning modifiers (“alleged,” “asserted,” “presumed” or “conceded”) before unfavorable facts
to denote the possibility that the information presented in the case is in
fact false. Other rhetorical devices work in the same way to either open
up certain options or close others. Mental verbs (“I think”, “I imagine”),
hedges (“generally,” “basically”), and qualifying adverbs (“seemingly,”
approximately,” “possibly”), for example, all serve to “qualify the force
of our assertions and conclusions.”67 Auxiliary verbs (“could have” and
“should have”) function in a similar way to suggest an alternative or
better course of action that ought to have taken place.68 This allows
judges to sneak in their own views as to the rightfulness or wrongfulness
of a party’s actions without flat-out saying “this is what I would have
done.” A variety of other expressions exist as well, each with the effect
of detracting from certainty, or diluting the veracity of any given proposition.69
Given these various techniques, it is important to note that while
these analytic theories are somewhat distinct, they often overlap and
work off of each other in very fluid and organic ways.70 This is something to keep in mind as we begin exploring Justice Kennedy’s abortion
jurisprudence, beginning with his first opinion on the subject in Ohio v.
Akron Center.71
III. OHIO V. AKRON CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Akron represented Kennedy’s
first opportunity to write a majority opinion on abortion as an Associate
Justice.72 Although the case was decided when Kennedy had just under
two years on the bench, Kennedy had already established a record of
voting with conservatives on these types of cases.73 The first example of
this was Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, a 1989 case involving
a Missouri law that required physicians to test for fetal age before performing an abortion if they had reason to believe the fetus was twenty
66

supra note 5, at 184.
Id. at 184 (quoting STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 75 (1958)).
68
Id.
69
See id.
70
See Logic and Ontology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/#AreOve (last updated Oct. 11, 2017).
71
497 U.S. 502, 506 (1990).
72
See id.
73
See Anthony M. Kennedy, supra note 8.
67

AMSTERDAM & BRUNER,
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weeks or older.74 A bare majority, which included Justice Kennedy, upheld the requirement as being reasonable in light of “the State’s interest
in protecting potential human life.”75
The second case, decided the following year and on the same
day as Akron, was Hodgson v. Minnesota.76 This case involved a Minnesota statute requiring “two-parent notification” of abortion decisions
of minors unless they obtained a judicial bypass.77 Although agreeing
with the judgment affirming the notification provision when accompanied by the judicial bypass mechanism, 78 Kennedy went further in a
separate concurrence arguing that the statute was valid even in absence
of any judicial bypass provision.79
Having sided with conservatives in Webster and Hodgson, Kennedy was poised to follow suit in Akron. On appeal from the Sixth Circuit, the suit involved then-pregnant Rachael Roe who had been denied
an abortion from the Akron Center for Reproductive Health Services
(Akron Center) based on Ohio’s new one-parent notification law.80 At
the time of the suit, Rachael was a single minor dependent on her parents.81 Similar to the “two-parent” notification requirement in Hodgson,
the statute in Akron required Rachael to notify at least one of her parents
before obtaining an abortion; it also included a similar “judicial bypass”
exception.82 In an effort to keep her decision private, however, Rachael
declined to use either avenue.83 Her attending doctor at Akron Center,
Dr. Gaujean, was thus forced to turn her away or otherwise subject himself to criminal penalties.84
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Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 513 (1989).
Id. at 519–20.
76
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 417 (1990).
77
Id. at 420.
78
See id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
79
Id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although brief, Kennedy’s
concurrence previews language that appears in Casey and Carhart. See COLUCCI, supra note
11, at 43.
80
See Stephanie R. Bryant, Constitutional Law—Due Process: Minor’s Abortion Right—
Ohio’s Parental Notification Statute—An Anti-Abortion Statute in Disguise? Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 605, 605 (1992).
81
Id.
82
See id. at 605–06, 621.
83
See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 512 (1990).
84
See id. at 509, 533 (“The physician risks civil damages, criminal penalties, including imprisonment, as well as revocation of his license for disobeying the statute’s commands.”); see also
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.85(B)(1) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(D)-(E)
(West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(23) (West 2020).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist assigned the opinion to Justice Kennedy
who spent little time deciding how to vote on the case and began circulating drafts of an opinion upholding the “one-parent notification” statute shortly after oral arguments.85 On the verge of going 0-for-3 in these
three cases, liberal Justice Blackmun circulated a colorful dissent criticizing Kennedy’s rhetoric in his preliminary draft of Akron: “[Kennedy’s] hyperbole…can have but one purpose: to further incite an
American press, public and pulpit already inflamed by the pronouncement made by a plurality of this Court last Term in Webster.”86
Kennedy quickly responded to the Justice’s concerns in a private
handwritten letter dated June 21, 1990:
Dear Harry,
After much hesitation, I decided it best for our
collegial relation and, I hope, mutual respect to tell you
that I harbor deep resentment at your paragraph on page
17 in Ohio v. Akron Center. You say my hyperbole is to
incite an inflamed public. To write with that purpose
would be a violation of my judicial duty.
I am still struggling with the whole abortion issue
and thought it proper to convey this in what I wrote.87
The crux of this impassioned exchange centered on Part V of
Kennedy’s initial draft.88 Alluding to the potential impact on the religious community, for example, Blackmun was not amused by Kennedy’s “paternalistic” and “philosophic[al]” language in that section
which broke dramatically in style and substance from the rest of the
opinion.89 With neither Blackmun nor Kennedy willing to budge, however, both ultimately left most of their respective homilies intact in the
final opinion.90 For Kennedy’s part, his insistence on including this
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COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 45-47.
Id. at 47 (citing Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 3 (draft, p. 17) (on file with Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)).
87
Id. at 45-47 (citing Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter dated June 21, 1990) (on file
with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)).
88
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The plurality
indulges in paternalistic comments about ‘‘profound philosophic choices”).
90
For Justice Kennedy, see id. at 519–20 (Kennedy, J., opinion); HELEN J. KNOWLES, THE TIE
GOES TO FREEDOM: JUSTICE ANTHONY M. KENNEDY ON LIBERTY 179 (2009) (“the language of
Part V went unchanged from start to finish”). For Justice Blackmun, compare COLUCCI supra
note 11, at 48 (citing Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (draft, p. 17) (letter of 21 June 1990),
86
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more controversial language, which we examine in greater detail below,
resulted in a two-tiered structure in which Parts I–IV of Akron remained
remarkably unexceptional in style and content but Part V stood out for
its probative and provocative language.91
Unfortunately for Justice Kennedy the sharp differences between Justice Blackmun and himself concerning Part V of the opinion
were also reflected in the final outcome of the case.92 Five Justices eventually joined Parts I–IV of Akron to form a six-three majority upholding
the “one-parent notification” requirement.93 However, only three Justices joined Part V, constituting merely a plurality of the Court.94 These
divisive results beg the question as to why Kennedy felt the need to include Part V in the final opinion at all. At least two explanations exist.
From a purely jurisprudential point of view, Justice Kennedy’s
inclusion and framing of Part V suggests that he was generally more
concerned with its future impact rather than its immediate relevance to
the litigants in Akron.95 To begin, Part V obscured the applicable legal
principle for future abortion cases by referencing both the “rational basis” test used in Webster and the “undue burden” test advocated by Justice O’Connor a few years earlier in City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health.96 Having appeared first in O’Connor’s 1983 dissent, and now in Akron’s plurality opinion, Kennedy moved the Court
one step closer towards fully embracing the “undue burden” test in a
majority opinion as it eventually did in Casey.97 This ideological shift
also represented Justice Kennedy’s earliest efforts to alter Roe v.
Wade’s98 constitutional foundation from “privacy” to “liberty” which

with Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (only changing
the term “purpose” for “result”).
91
See KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 178, and compare Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
at 507–19 (Part I-IV), with Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20 (Part V).
92
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20.
93
Id. at 506, 520. Although the Court held the statute valid when coupled with the judicial
bypass mechanism, it ultimately left open the question of whether the judicial bypass was “required.” Id. at 510.
94
Id. at 506. Part V of Akron was joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and
Justice Scalia. Id.
95
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 44.
96
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20. Justice O’Connor first articulated an
early version of the undue burden test in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., as an alternative to Roe’s trimester framework. 462 U.S. 416, 459, 463–64 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
97
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
98
410 U.S. 113 (1973) holding modified by Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79
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was much more consistent with his own jurisprudential philosophy concerning individual rights.99
Aside from these jurisprudential considerations, a second explanation is gleaned from Justice Kennedy’s exchange with Justice
Blackmun.100 It is in this correspondence that Kennedy reveals his own
personal “struggle” to reconcile abortion rights with his personal views
on the subject.101 What is truly fascinating, however, is not that Kennedy
admits that this struggle exists but that he confesses his express intention
to “. . . convey this in what [he] wrote.”102 Given, Kennedy’s Catholicism, the analysis that follows suggests that his rhetoric in Akron can
also be understood as illustrating Kennedy’s effort to reconcile his personal religious views–whether consciously or subconsciously–with his
larger role as a Supreme Court Justice.
PART III-B: KENNEDY’S VOICE IN AKRON
Justice Kennedy begins Part I of Akron with a rather unexciting
restatement of the Ohio “one-parent notification” statute, detailing all of
its exceptions.103 Consider the beginning of the first few paragraphs:
The Ohio Legislature, in November 1985, enacted
Amended Substitute House Bill 319 (H.B. 319) [making]
it a criminal offense, except in four specified circumstances, for a physician or other person to perform an
abortion on an unmarried and unemancipated woman under 18 years of age….
The first and second circumstances in which a physician
may perform an abortion relate to parental notice and
consent….
The third and fourth circumstances depend on a judicial
procedure that allows a minor to bypass the notice and
consent….
99
See generally KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 19–51 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in light of libertarian views); COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 43–48. As Colucci notes, framing
the standard as one which protects women against an undue burden imposed by the State implies
a value on individual liberty and autonomy consisted with Justice Kennedy’s own evolving libertarian jurisprudence. Id. at 44.
100
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 45–48.
101
See id. at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter dated June 21,
1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)).
102
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.)).
103
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506–10 (1990).
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The juvenile court must hold a hearing at the earliest possible time, but not later than the fifth business day after
the minor files the complaint….104
Part II follows an analogous pattern, diving into a textbook application of the case law, while Parts III and IV address counter arguments.105 Throughout his discussion in Parts I–IV, Justice Kennedy
gives little mention to Rachael Roe’s specific factual situation, never
examines the history of abortion-limiting laws, never references any social science data concerning abortions, and never cites to an amicus brief
in his reasoning.106 His opinion, at least up to Part IV, is thus, structured,
formal, and somewhat boring.
Taking a page from Amsterdam and Bruner, it is easy to see how
Kennedy’s dry and perhaps academic style in Parts I–IV of Akron fits
within a larger “natural-theoretical” approach to judicial opinion writing. Kennedy’s language in Part I is “natural” because it is descriptive
and straightforward while Parts II–IV are “theoretical” in that they essentially constitute one large IRAC.107 This, in turn, enables readers to
verify and corroborate Kennedy’s rationale before deciding whether to
“agree” or “accept” his ultimate conclusion. But Justice Kennedy goes
one step further and supplements this “natural-theoretical” framework
with ontological construction techniques that “frame” or “center” the
case as one focused on “procedure” rather than “persons.”
Take Justice Kennedy’s use of the litigants, for example. To
begin, Kennedy refers to Rachael Roe and Dr. Gaujean by name only
once in the entire opinion.108 Second, this introduction comes only after
an almost three-page discussion of Ohio law.109 Both of these features
force readers to focus on the mechanical aspects of the statute rather
than on the individual stories of the litigants. Third, Kennedy continues
to depersonalize these individuals by generically referring to the parties
as “the State” and “Appellees” for the rest of the opinion.110 Even here,
any mention of the actual parties is dominated by repeated references to
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Id. at 507–08.
See id. at 510–19.
106
See id. at 507–19.
107
IRAC is an acronym for ‘‘issue, role (or relevant law), application (or analysis), and conclusion’’: a method used in composing certain legal documents and reports. Richard Norquist,
IRAC
Method
of
Legal
Writing,
THOUGHTCO.
(Aug.
12,
2019),
https://www.thoughtco.com/irac-legal-writing-1691083.
108
Id. at 509.
109
See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507–09 (1990).
110
See id. at 509–20.
105
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“procedure[s]” (thirty times in Parts I–IV) and “require[ments]” (thirtyone times in Parts I–IV).111
Notice how these rhetorical devices gear audiences away from
reading in any “human-narrative” into the opinion. In this vein, Justice
Kennedy’s omissions function in much the same manner. Kennedy, for
example, excludes Rachael’s allegations of parental abuse; 112 does not
address the prevalence and psychological impact of physical and sexual
abuse by parents despite its inclusion in the Appellees’ brief;113 and fails
to mention the harsh criminal penalties that would have attached to Dr.
Gaujean had he induced the abortion without complying with the statute.114 Thus, just as the emphasis on “procedure” over “persons” leads
readers to stoically assess the case so does the absence of any narrative
cues hinder them from “sympathizing” with Rachael Roe and Dr. Gaujean on any personal level.
Whether this rhetoric actually convinces lay readers to side with
the State is a question outside the scope of this article. What we do
know, however, is that Justice Kennedy’s persuasive writing was sufficient to cobble together five additional votes with respect to Parts I–IV
of the opinion.115 Indeed, it is possible that, given his short tenure on the
Court at the time, Kennedy consciously adopted minimally controversial language in order to gain the support of his colleges, including Justice O’Connor (a swing vote at the time) and Justice Stevens (arguably
the most liberal Justice on the Rehnquist Court).
Yet the looming question of how exactly this relates to Justice
Kennedy’s Catholicism remains. As Kennedy’s exchange with
Blackmun suggests, Parts I–IV must be read together with Part V which
only garnered three additional votes, and is therefore not part of the controlling rationale. Despite its relegated status, however, Part V is the
only section in Akron mentioning a rule.116 Indeed, Kennedy’s ambiguity as to which rule is being applied (he mentions both Webster’s “ra-
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See id. at 507–19.
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1127 (N.D. Ohio 1986),
amended by 110 FRD 576 (N.D. Ohio 1986) and affd sub nom. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health
v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502 (1990).
113
Brief for Appellee at 12–14, Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (No. 88-805),
1989 WL 1127539, at *8–9.
114
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 533 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.85(B)(1) (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.12(D)-(E) (West
2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4731.22(B)(23) (West 2020).
115
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 505.
116
See Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519–20.
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tionality” test and O’Connor’s “undue burden” test) may, in part, account for its plurality status.117 In addition, Part V also probes into the
larger metaphysical questions surrounding abortion rights, the framing
of which resonates with traditional Catholic doctrine.118 Thus, although
not part of the holding, Part V’s rhetoric may provide greater support
for viewing Kennedy’s, larger “struggl[e] with the whole abortion issue”119 as influenced by his religion. Consider the following passage:
A free and enlightened society may decide that each of its members should attain a clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound
philosophic choices confronted by a woman who is considering whether
to seek an abortion. Her decision will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and the origins of the other human life that lie within the
embryo.120
In addition to sounding like a theology textbook, Justice Kennedy’s word choice here (“profound philosophical choices,” “destiny,”
and “origins of other human life”) is miles apart from the dry, procedural
language in the preceding twelve pages of the opinion. Consequently,
Kennedy’s almost spiritual discourse breaks away from his “natural theoretical” approach to judicial writing and creeps into the “religious supernatural” realm. Recall that where the category is “religious supernatural,” judges seek to construct a “normative religious” account of the
case where ordinary everyday facts are backed up by an assumed understanding of some higher order.121 Transitioning from the locutionary dimension to the illocutionary dimension, readers see the following take
place:
Warning/Assertion: “[A] woman who is considering whether to
seek an abortion [is confronted by] profound philosophic choices. . . .
Her decision will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity, and the
origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo.”122
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Particularly interesting here is the fact that Justice O’Connor did not sign on to Part V of the
opinion despite its inclusion of “undue burden” language. See id. at 506, 519–20. Colucci suggests several factors may have influenced this decision including: (1) O’Connor’s tendency to
write separately; (2) Part V’s equivocation of “rational basis” and “undue burden”; and (3) Part
V’s paternalistic and patriarchal language concerning minors and women in general which
O’Connor may have found offensive or at least unnecessary. See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 45.
118
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 72 (stating “Much of [Kennedy’s] rhetoric about human
dignity, liberty, and postabortion regret resonates with the language of papal statements issued
after Vatican II . . .”).
119
Id. at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter dated June 21, 1990))
(on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.)).
120
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 520 (emphasis added).
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AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32.
122
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 520.
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Translation: Even if you disagree with everything I just said…in
the end these choices are way too deep, important, and even – dare I say
– spiritual, for us, (especially me) and these woman to fully understand.
Consider, next, how Justice Kennedy uses this “philosophical”
language to set up his final point in the opinion:
Assertion: The State is entitled to assume that, for most of its
people, the beginnings of that understanding will be within the family,
society’s most intimate association. It is both rational and fair for the
State to conclude that, in most instances, the family will strive to give a
lonely or even terrified minor advice that is both compassionate and
mature…. It would deny all dignity to the family to say that the State
cannot take this reasonable step…to ensure that, in most cases, a young
woman will receive guidance and understanding from a parent.123
Translation: If these questions are too deep for me, they are certainly too deep and confusing for these girls, at least in most cases. It
makes sense, then, that these girls receive the support, love, and guidance only a parent can give. I have faith that parents will provide just
that kind of support, in most cases, if given the opportunity (i.e., if minors are forced to ask for it).
There are several important working pieces in these two short
passages. To begin, in the first passage Kennedy presents the larger social issues attending abortion not as “medical,” or “psychological” in
nature but as “moral” and “philosophical.” This approach feeds into a
“religious supernatural” reading of Part V and betrays Kennedy’s own
internal “struggle” to reconcile his personal views with his role as a Supreme Court justice – something Kennedy finds a real challenge based
on his exchange with Justice Blackmun.124
Second, Kennedy continues to limit any “human narrative” to
one focused on the family rather than the actual minor facing the decision. Here, Kennedy litters his reasoning with paternalistic language
(“the beginnings of . . . understanding will be within the family”…”lonely,” and “terrified minor[s],” need “compassionate and mature” “advice”) that ultimately betrays his own conceptions of normalcy
within the home.125 This conception, in turn, is likely influenced by his
unremarkable upbringing in a traditional two-parent Catholic household.126 Indeed, Blackmun calls Kennedy out on this in his dissent:

123
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Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 520.
See Anthony M. Kennedy, supra note 8.
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The plurality indulges in paternalistic comments about “profound philosophic choices”; the “[woman’s] own destiny and personal
dignity”; the “origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo”;
the family as “society’s most intimate association”… and the desired
assumption that “in most cases” the woman will receive “guidance and
understanding from a parent.”127
Some of this may be so “in most cases” and, it is to be hoped, in
judges’ own and other warm and protected, nurturing family environments. But those “most cases” need not rely on constitutional protections that are so vital for others. I have cautioned before that there is
“another world ‘out there’” that the Court “either chooses to ignore or
fears to recognize.”128
Part V’s location within Kennedy’s overall opinion is also telling. By encompassing Parts I–IV within a “natural theoretical” framework, Kennedy sets up a judicial logic-based proof that readers can find
security in and depend on (i.e., according to our case law, if you have
A, B, and C, then you can prove law X is valid; D, E, and F clearly show
A, B, and C; therefore law X is valid). What we get out of Akron, then,
is traditional legal analysis (Parts I–IV) capped off with probative philosophical language on the “bigger questions” concerning abortion (Part
V).
As one commentator suggests “. . . Kennedy’s struggle over
abortion was not about whether to overturn Roe. It was about to how to
modify and narrow Roe . . .”129 Given Kennedy’s Catholicism, however,
it is hard to see this explicit “struggle” as merely philosophical in nature.
The idea that Kennedy had trouble applying his liberty-based approach
to judicial interpretation130 due to some mere internal academic colloquy
seems suspect. A more realistic picture of Akron then would be to read
Part V’s rhetoric as pointing towards how Kennedy’s Catholicism influenced and shaped his personal views on the subject.
Several factors support this interplay between religion and rhetoric in Akron. First, we know Kennedy was “struggling with the whole
abortion issue” at the time Akron was being decided, and that he intentionally sought to “convey that in what [he] wrote.”131 Second, based on
Kennedy’s elaborate language in Part V, it seems fair to infer that his
127

Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 541 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted, and underlines added).
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COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48.
130
See id.; KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 178–79.
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COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 47–48 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.)).
128

CANTARERO

56

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 20:1

“struggle” with abortion was uniquely moral in nature, and, thus understandably influenced by his religious convictions. Third, given his Catholic upbringing, the Catholic Church’s position on abortion, and extrinsic evidence on Kennedy’s personal repudiation of abortion, it is equally
fair to assume that his religious views informed his moral objection,
which, in turn, influenced his judicial writing style. As the next section
shows, this subtle connection becomes more explicit as Justice Kennedy
continues his mission to narrow Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
IV. PLANNED PARENTHOOD V. CASEY
If there is one case which illustrates both Justice Kennedy’s importance as a “swing vote” and the import of his personal values in deciding cases, it is Casey. 132 A 1992 abortion case out of Pennsylvania,
Casey dealt with five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control
Act which restricted a married woman’s ability to have an abortion.133
Besides the obvious implications on woman’s rights, the case was particularly relevant for its treatment of Roe v. Wade, the landmark 1973
case which had previously affirmed a woman’s right to an abortion as
constitutionally protected under the First Amendment.134
Of the several provisions at issue in Casey one required that a
woman seeking an abortion provide a signed statement that she has notified her husband of her intention to have the procedure.135 Another
specified that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours
before the abortion is performed.136 The underlying purpose behind
these provisions mimicked those of Akron – to make it as hard as possible for a woman to have an abortion.137 While a general exception was
made in cases of medical emergency, physicians nevertheless challenged the statutes as being at odds with the Court’s precedent in Roe.138
Interestingly enough, at the time the Court heard the case it was
more or less evenly split in terms of judicial ideology.139 Liberal justices
such as Blackmun, Stevens and Souter, would have no issue upholding
132

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 833, 844.
134
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973), modified by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
135
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
136
Id.
137
See generally Casey Quinlan, Parental notification laws delay minors’ access to abortion
care, study finds, THINKPROGRESS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/parental-notification-laws-delay-access-abortion-care-857ac91248fa/.
138
Id. at 879–80.
139
See JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 151 (2007).
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Roe in its entirety, and O’Connor’s voting record while on the Arizona
legislature suggested she would follow suit. 140 Conversely, conservative
Justices Scalia, Thomas, White and Chief Justice Rehnquist saw this as
an opportunity to categorically overturn Roe v. Wade, which they
viewed as an excessive use of judicial activism.141 As a result, there was
clear and substantial pressure on Kennedy to alone – for all intents and
purposes – decide what for many Americans was and remains a moral
and religious question.
The Court laid down its ruling on June 29, 1992 affirming the
“core” holding of Roe, that a woman has a fundamental right to have an
abortion.142 As Constitutional law scholar Helen Knowles notes, the plurality shifted the abortion right’s constitutional foundations from privacy to liberty just as Justice Kennedy desired.143 In the process it rejected the rigid trimester framework of Roe and articulated an undue
burden standard to allow for more state regulation of abortion.144 Recall
that in Roe, the Court created the trimester framework in an effort to
balance the fundamental right to abortion with the government’s two
legitimate interests: protecting the mother’s health and protecting the
“potentiality of human life.”145 In the first trimester, the Court left the
decision solely to the woman and her physician.146 From the end of the
first trimester until fetal viability, the state’s first interest in protecting
the health of the mother would become “compelling” and the state could
regulate the procedure if the regulation “reasonably relate[d] to the
preservation and protection of maternal health.” 147At viability, which
the Court believed to be in the third trimester, the state’s interest in “potential life” would become compelling and it could regulate abortion to
protect “potential life” and even forbid abortion barring certain
health/life exceptions.148
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See id. at 150–54.
See TOOBIN, supra note 1, at 55 (referencing Scalia’’s pronounced intent to overturn Roe).’’
142
Casey, 505 U.S. at. 844–46 (“we are led to conclude this: the essential holding of Roe v.
Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed”). The Court also continued Kennedy’s
trend of farming the right as a “liberty” right rather than a “privacy” right. See id. at 844 (showing that the first word in the opinion is, in fact, “liberty”).
143
See KNOWLES, supra note 90, at 181; see also COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 52–53.
144
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878–79.
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See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
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To implement its holding in Casey the Court “rejected both
Roe’s rigid trimester framework and the interpretation of Roe that considered all previability regulations of abortion unwarranted.”149 Instead
it held that:
Before viability, a State “may not prohibit any woman from
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.”
It also may not impose upon this right an undue burden, which
exists if a regulation’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.”
On the other hand, “[r]egulations which do no more than create
a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent or guardian of
a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise
of the right to choose.”150
But the decision was not without an unusual twist. The opinion
was authored by three justices: O’Connor, Souter, and Kennedy.151 Although the Court has never openly divulged exactly how it appropriated
the writing duties between these three justices, one need not read very
far into the opinion to make that determination. Indeed, commentators
routinely attribute certain section to particular justices, often in conclusory fashion.152 As Jeffery Toobin explains in The Nine:
In their secret collaboration, Kennedy had agreed to write the
opening section of the opinion, where they announced that they would
preserve Roe. Souter would write next, about the importance of stare
decisis, and O’Connor would write the final section, explaining why the
spousal notification provision of the Pennsylvania law had to be struck
down.153
If we take Toobin’s widely accepted view, Parts I and II (pp.
844-53 are attributable to Justice Kennedy, Parts III and IV (pp. 853879) to Justice Souter, and Part V (pp. 879-901) to Justice O’Connor.154
Adopting this structure allows us to adequately narrow our focus on Justice Kennedy’s judicial writing style.
149

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (discussing Casey).
Id. (discussing Casey’s “undue burden” test) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Casey, 505 U.S. at 843.
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See, e.g., Terry Eastland, The Tempting of Justice Kennedy, THE AM. SPECTATOR (Feb.
1993), https://spectator.org/the-tempting-of-justice-kennedy/ (taking it as a given that Justice
Kennedy wrote Part I of the opinion).
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IV-B. KENNEDY’S VOICE IN CASEY
Justice Kennedy sets the tone of the opinion in the first line in
classic grandiose fashion: “Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt.”155 Consistent with the “religion-supernatural” category, the pronouncement reads both powerfully and ominously, as if some divine
command were to follow. In addition, Parts I and II of the opinion are
sprinkled with additional suggestive language that build on his use of
categories. After laying out the rule of the case, and reaffirming the essential hold of Roe, Kennedy adds:
[Passage I] At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State (…)
[Passage II] The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large
extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place
in society.156
Unlike his approach in Akron, Kennedy wastes no time infusing
Casey with an eerie and metaphysical tone that continues through Parts
I and II of the opinion.157 In what would on other occasions be mere
dicta, then, Kennedy’s prose throughout the opinion provides fertile
ground for exploring intersection of his personal beliefs and his role as
a judge.158 A final passage from Part I further buttresses this perspective:
[Passage III] Men and women of good conscience can disagree,
and we suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound moral
and spiritual implications of terminating a pregnancy, even in its earliest
stage. Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most
basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.159
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Casey, 505 U.S. at. 844.
Id. at 851–52 (emphasis added).
157
See id. at 844–53.
158
In terms of precedential value, Justice Kennedy’s use of language here can be understood
as dicta in the strict sense. Dicta typically refer to “statements in a judicial opinion that are not
necessary to support the decision reached by the court.” See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article
III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994). Similar to his use of the plurality section of Akron,
Kennedy nevertheless utilizes powerful language in Casey in order to engage the reader, who,
based on the topic at issue, is likely to be religious. Kennedy, himself a Catholic, aims to win
over a religious audience by inducing it to accepting his logic as narrated within, what for many
religious groups, is a familiar “religion supernatural” category.
159
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850 (emphasis added).
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Taking these passages together, four observations are immediately clear. First, Justice Kennedy clearly did not see resolution of the
issue as a mere academic exercise160 but appreciated the real-world impact both political and socially that his decisive vote would have. Second, we see traces of Kennedy’s own struggle to reconcile his personal
views and his role as a judge with an obligation to uphold the rule of
law. Here, Casey’s language is even more revealing than that of Akron.
Whereas Kennedy’s limits his word choice to “profound philosophical
choices” in Part V of Akron, for example, his use of the terms such as
“spiritual” and “moral code” in Casey resonates more directly with a
traditional Catholic mindset. Finally, Kennedy also exposes the reader
to his particular hermeneutical approach to applying that law.
Beginning with the first observation, Justice Kennedy paternalistic prose evidences a conscious effort to publicly acknowledge the importance of an opinion affirming Roe v. Wade.161 His appreciation of this
“great moral issue,” is expressed both in terms of breadth and magnitude. With respect to breadth, Justice Kennedy acknowledges the broadreaching implications of the decision. In Passage III, for example, his
remark that “[m]en and women of good conscience can disagree, and
we suppose some always shall disagree” recognizes that more than the
litigant’s claims are at stake.162 Indeed, like Parts I–IV of Akron, Parts I
and II of Casey are almost entirely void of any individualizing language
specific to the petitioner or respondent in the case.163
Passage I, likewise, deals with the latter issue of magnitude or
how deeply the decision will impact those affected.164 Here Kennedy
adds that “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life.”165 He frames the category of inquiry as one of life’s “big questions,” which, in turn, has two effects. First, as mentioned, it appreciates
the scale of the decision and the depth of its impact on the minds and
hearts of all citizenry. Second, it frames the case as dealing with a “state
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Recall that we also rejected this view as to Part V of Akron. See supra text accompanying
note 129–30.
161
This paternalistic language, moreover, is consistent with Kennedy’s earlier opinions opposing Roe. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 541 (1990) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting) (“The plurality indulges in paternalistic comments about ‘profound philosophic
choices’ [and] the [woman’s] own destiny and personal dignity”) (internal citations omitted).
162
Casey, 505 U.S. at 850.
163
See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 507–19 (1990); Casey, 505 U.S.
at 844–53.
164
Akron, 497 U.S. at 5507-19; Casey, 505 U.S. at 844-53.
165
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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interest in morality,” whose boundaries must be set via judicial intervention.166
This latter point engrains the audience with Kennedy’s “supernatural religious” narrative, requiring the reader to enlist “belief as an
act of faith.”167 These great “mysteries” of “existence” are “beliefs”
which may be right or wrong. Kennedy’s argument then is that the state
should not assert what is “right” or “wrong” but rather defer to the
Court’s judgment in erring on the side of extending human liberty rather
than retracting it.168 He asks us to “trust” him that these “big questions”
should be largely solved by each woman seeking an abortion.169
Our second observation, that Justice Kennedy illustrates his own
struggle to compromise on abortion, shifts the focus from a universal
view to one centered on an individual character – Kennedy.170 Here,
Kennedy continually supplements the “religious-supernatural” motif
with additional ontological construction techniques.171 Kennedy, for example, uses the terms “moral,” and “spiritual” no less than four times in
Passages II and III alone.172 But these terms are also reinforced with operative language; the phrases “principles of,” “imperatives,” and
“code[s],” for example, all amplify the consequences of those “moral,”
and “spiritual” beliefs.173 Justice Kennedy views the issue not as just one
of law, but of religion which affects him personally.174
Kennedy places himself at the center of the narrative when he
writes that “Some of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our
most basic principles of morality.”175 The use of the “us” pronoun is a
clear break from the “men and woman…may disagree” language previously used. As the Blackmun papers show, Kennedy had a genuinely
difficult time reaching his decision on abortion rights.176 This was especially true given that Kennedy had generally sided with conservatives
in abortion cases such as Webster, Hodgson, and Akron in the years
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See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48.
See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32.
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See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 48.
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See id.
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See Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–69.
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See id.
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See id. at 846–69.
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See id.
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See id.
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Id. at 850.
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leading up to Casey.177 Notwithstanding this record, however, Kennedy
still “struggled” with the issue on a personal level. As one commentator
notes, for example, Kennedy had originally voted at to uphold the Pennsylvania requirements in conference, and only changed his mind after
much internal reflection.178 What exactly brought him to that position is
found in our third observation.
One’s hermeneutic is fundamentally ones method of interpreta179
tion. Understood expansively, it is the way one chooses to approach a
problem. Kennedy’s hermeneutical approach to moral issues in his judicial reasoning is cached in an often cited passage from Casey: “Some
of us as individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles
of morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”180
As the Blackmun papers suggest, this was perhaps one of the
most difficult passages for Kennedy to write.181 Kennedy’s vote in Casey was a systematic shift from his jurisprudential stance on abortion in
virtually all the prior cases.182 This “shift” is one that moved from an
internal “struggle” in Akron (to reconcile his personal views with his
judicial duty) to a clearer position in Casey which recognized that his
subjective views on abortion had no business in deciding a Supreme
Court case.183 Consequently, Justice Kennedy first builds up the importance of moral issues within a “religious supernatural” framework.184
He then amplifies that importance by putting his own struggle up for
display. As a final act of judicial integrity he attests that despite “our”
moral views, those views alone “cannot control our decision;” that regardless of my, yours, or anyone’s “moral code,” the Court’s obligation
is to define liberty for all, not just for Catholics, atheists or any other
individual group that seeks to infiltrate the Courts decision-making process by tapping into personal sympathies.185 Although Casey ultimately
177
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990) (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Ohio v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Kennedy writing the majority).
178
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 49.
179
Hermeneutic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hermeneutic (last visited Apr. 9, 2020).
180
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (emphasis added).
181
See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 47 (quoting Blackmun Papers, Box 544, Folder 2 (letter
dated June 21, 1990)) (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.)).
182
See id.; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833–39.
183
Compare supra text accompanying notes 101–04, with supra text accompanying notes 171–
79.
184
See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32.
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See Casey, 505 U.S. at 850–51.
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did cut back on Roe, Kennedy’s internal transformation reflected, for
him, a revival of a fundamental judicial principle – impartiality.
Considering that Casey includes more religious-like language
(“moral codes” and “spiritual imperatives”) than Akron (“philosophical
choices”) we have all the more reason to view Kennedy’s rhetoric as
being, at the very least, influenced by his Catholicism.186 Justice Kennedy writes about “spiritual imperatives” and “moral codes” because
these are the issues that came to his mind.187 Why they came into mind,
this article suggests, is because Kennedy himself was dealing with them
on a very real and personal level.188 He thus utilized the “supernatural
religious” category to expand upon that “struggle” and, given his conclusion, perhaps end the debate for himself as to whether his personal
“religious” view have any place in his opinion writing process.189
Once again the question of whether readers buy into Kennedy’s
“religious supernatural” narrative is open for debate. Justice Kennedy
attempted not only to convey his own internal struggle in the opinion –
a practice consistent with his prior opinions on abortion190 – but also his
appreciation for each reader’s own potential ethical dilemma in accepting his verdict. Key, however, is the fact that while this sympathy narrative set aside pro-life views in the end, it did not totally abandon them.
This is so because, despite Kennedy’s affirmation of the “fundamental”
principle of Roe, the opinion in Casey changed Roe’s rigid trimester
framework to the more relaxed undue burden standard espoused by Justice O’Connor.191 While the fundamental holding of Roe was retained,
there is no doubt that the undue burden standard provided states with
greater opportunities to restrict abortion in certain contexts.192 Thus
while the lay reader may have bought into Kennedy’s narrative, a critical scholar would quickly understand this as just another compromise
between a liberty-based approach to judicial interpretation and Kennedy’s personal [religious] views. Here, Colucci’s remarks ring true that
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See id. (writing that religious and moral codes cannot dictate the holding in this case).
See Jelliff, supra note 9, at 119–20.
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See COLUCCI, supra note 11, at 46–47.
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See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 5, at 32.
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Justice Blackmun “. . . I am still struggling with the whole abortion issue and thought it proper
to convey this in what I wrote.”).
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“Kennedy’s struggle…was about how to modify and narrow Roe to allow for more democratic regulation of abortion while retaining it as a
judicial enforceable liberty.”193
V. GONZALES V. CARHART
Having voted in favor of “parental-notification” laws in Hodgson and Akron, and after axing the “trimester framework” in Casey, Justice Kennedy’s next challenge came in the form of the controversial
“partial-birth abortion” statutes.194 Whereas prior statutes generally focused on mandating or proscribing the actions of women, the “partialbirth abortion” laws centered on preventing physicians from utilizing
certain procedures in performing second-trimester abortions.195 The first
of these cases was Stenberg v. Carhart, a 5-4 decision which struck
down Nebraska’s criminal ban on a second-trimester procedure as an
undue burden on a woman’s right to have an abortion.196 Specifically,
the Court considered Nebraska’s ban on Dilation and Evacuation (D &
E).197 This procedure entailed extracting a fetus from the womb through
the cervix.198 In some cases the fetus could be removed more or less
intact but often was removed piecemeal by having the physician make
several “passes” through the cervix.199
Consistent with his voting record in Akron and Casey, Justice
Kennedy issued a dissenting opinion arguing that the Stenberg majority
“repudiate[d]” the “central premise” of Casey that the “the States retain
a critical and legitimate role in legislating on the subject of abortion.”200
In the process, he exposed his own moral repulsion to the procedure by
describing it in vivid detail.201 Here, for example, Kennedy adopted language from the anti-abortion movement referring to the doctors as
“abortionist[s]” thirteen times in his dissent and describing D & E’s as
involving the “dismemberment,” “tearing,” and “dragging” of fetuses
until they “[bleed] to death.”202 He emphasized this language within his
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larger moral framework of securing the State’s interest in preserving and
promoting fetal life.203
Justice Kennedy continued this graphic tone several years later
in Gonzales v. Carhart when the Court reviewed a federal version of the
Nebraska statute.204 Passed largely in response to the Court’s decision
in Stenberg, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“2003 Act”)
differed from the Nebraska Act in two important ways. First, although
both statutes applied to physicians and not women seeking the procedure, only the 2003 Act included a scienter requirement on the part of
the physician.205 Second, the 2003 Act was narrower in that it covered
only a variation of the D & E procedure at issue in Stenberg, namely,
“intact D & E’s.”206 As the Court elaborated “[t]he main difference between the two procedures is that in intact D & E a doctor extracts the
fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes”207 whereas the traditional D&E generally call for removing the fetus in pieces. The logic
here was that “intact D & E’s” were closer to infanticide in that they
often involved killing the fetus after a majority of its body was already
outside the womb.208
Once again assigned to write the opinion, Kennedy hoped to secure a majority upholding the 2003 Act in his larger effort to continually
narrow Roe’s imprint. With Justice O’ Connor (who held the decisive
fifth vote in Stenberg) now replaced by a much more conservative Justice Alito, Kennedy again acted as a “swing vote” in yet another monumental abortion case.209 As a result, and in a total shift from the 5-4 decision in Stenberg, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart ultimately upheld
the federal ban on “intact D&E’s” in a bitter 5-4 split decision.210 Aside
from its clear precedential value, the case adds to the conversation on
Kennedy’s religion and judicial writing style not because of its particular structure (as with Akron’s two-tiered approach) or its pinning of

203
Id. at 979 (stating “The decision nullifies a law expressing the will of the people of Nebraska
that medical procedures must be governed by moral principles having their foundation in the
intrinsic value of human life, including the life of the unborn”).
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Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
205
Id. at 148.
206
Id. at 136–39, 150–53.
207
Id. at 137.
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See, e.g., id. at 139 (“Some doctors performing an intact D & E attempt to remove the fetus
without collapsing the skull. Yet one doctor would not allow delivery of a live fetus younger
than 24 weeks because ‘the objective of [his] procedure is to perform an abortion,’ not a birth.”)
(internal citations omitted).
209
See Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2008).
210
See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 155–56.
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women’s rights against society’s moral condemnation (as in Casey).211
Rather, Justice Kennedy’s opinion again betrays his personal views on
the issue with its vivid description of the procedure and heightened paternalistic language. Applying the same logic we used in assessing Akron and Casey, we can also see how this rhetoric reflects the deeper
Catholic dogma that likely influences his personal leanings on the issue.
The decision itself broke down into five sections. Part I starts
with the Act, the policy behind it, and the procedural history leading up
to the instant case.212 Part II sets up the applicable standard in a twopage summary of Roe and Casey.213 Part III & IV apply the standard to
the 2003 Act with Part III addressing the Act’s “operation and effect”
214
and Part IV assessing whether it constitutes a “substantial obstacle to
the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure.”215 Part V concludes
by upholding the 2003 Act in its entirety.216
Before discussing Kennedy’s vivid descriptions of the procedure, it is worth noting that this overall structure of the opinion has a
marked resemblance to that of Akron. Recall that in Akron Kennedy also
began with a detail explanation of the statute followed by one giant
IRAC with all the expected pieces: precedent, application, counterarguments, and conclusion. However, it is Kennedy’s unique rhetoric that
distinguishes the two cases in terms of style and substance, beginning
which his description of various medical operations.
First, unlike the dull, formal, and bureaucrat administrative actions at issue in Akron, or Casey for that matter, the 2003 Act focuses
on much more intense, detailed, and visually-graphic medical procedures, “intact D & E’s.” Kennedy capitalizes on this distinction to paint
the surgery in the most negative light possible. Here, Kennedy starts not
by copying and pasting the statute’s language into his opinion but by
describing how the medical procedure it discusses is actually performed.
Consider Kennedy’s discussion of the traditional and intact D & E’s at
the beginning of his opinion:
211
The language of the Act at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart focused on the actions of the physicians who perform abortions not the women who seek them. As a result, Kennedy’s language
in Carhart differs slightly from that of Casey where the statute at issue was specifically mandating or proscribing the action of women. See generally Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124
(2007).
212
Id. at 133–45.
213
Id. at 145–46.
214
Id. at 146–56.
215
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 156–67.
216
Id. at 167–68. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy also asserts that the facial challenges bought by the physicians were improper in the instant case and should never have been
considered. He adds that in such cases an as-applied challenge would have been more appropriate. Id.
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[Traditional D & E:] After sufficient dilation…[t]he doctor, often guided by ultrasound…grips a fetal part with the forceps and pulls
it back through the cervix and vagina, continuing to pull even after meeting resistance from the cervix. The friction causes the fetus to tear apart.
For example, a leg might be ripped off the fetus as it is pulled through
the cervix and out of the woman. The process of evacuating the fetus
piece by piece continues until it has been completely removed. A doctor
may make 10 to 15 passes with the forceps to evacuate the fetus in its
entirety . . .217
[Intact D & E:] In the usual intact D & E the fetus’ head lodges
in the cervix, and dilation is insufficient to allow it to pass…
At this point, the right-handed surgeon slides the fingers of the
left [hand] along the back of the fetus and “hooks” the shoulders of the
fetus…
While maintaining this tension…the surgeon takes a pair of
blunt curved Metzenbaum scissors [and] carefully advances the tip,
curved down, along the spine…[until it] contacts the base of the skull…
Having safely entered the skull, he spreads the scissors to enlarge the opening. The surgeon removes the scissors and introduces a
suction catheter into this hole and evacuates the skull contents. With the
catheter still in place, he applies traction to the fetus, removing it completely from the patient.218
Justice Kennedy dedicates six-full pages to describing both procedures in explicit detail.219 With respect to the second description, however, he clarifies the language as merely “an abortion doctor’s clinical
description.”220 In order to get a clearer and more emotionally provoking
view of the process he adds a second description from a nurse who witnessed the same method performed on a 26 ½-week old fetus:
Dr. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed the baby’s legs
and pulled them down into the birth canal. Then he delivered the baby’s
body and the arms—everything but the head….
The baby’s little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his
little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of
his head, and the baby’s arms jerked out, like a startle reaction, like a
flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall. The doctor
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opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered suction tube into the opening, and sucked the baby’s brains out.
Now the baby went completely limp….He threw the baby in a
pan, along with the placenta and the instruments he had just used.221
This last description differs strikingly from the prior two, with
each more unsettling than the last. This imagery, moreover, fits within
Kennedy’s “human narrative” of victimizing the fetuses and criticizing
physicians. Tapping to society’s conception of the “indifferent” or “mad
scientist” (perhaps a particular TV show or medical movie thriller
comes to mind) Kennedy forces reader to choose between “innocence”
and “impersonal;” between the “the poor defenseless infant” and the
“stoic medical professional.”
One similar thread between Akron, Casey, and Carhart is the use
of rhetorical devices to amplify a particular category of thought. In Part
I of Carhart, Kennedy adds to his “human narrative” by shifting his
audiences’ ontological understanding of the case; in other words “centering” the facts to narrow the readers’ focus towards “fetuses as human
beings” rather than “pregnant women as citizens with rights.”222 Consider the nurse’s description. Here, Kennedy presents the startling image
of an innocent “baby” with “little fingers” and “little feet” who “thinks”
and “jerks” before having his [or her] “brains sucked out.”223 Juxtaposed
to this image is the protagonistic physician who indifferently throws the
“baby in a pan” after delivery – even alongside the very instruments just
used to kill the unborn fetus.224 Thus, an “Act proscrib[ing] a method of
abortion in which a fetus is killed just inches before completion of the
birth process”225 becomes not only permissible but desirable.
In addition to ontology, Kennedy touches on epistemology by
pointing to the variety and uncertainty involved in “intact D & E’s.”226
Epistemology concerns our scope of knowledge about what is “possible.”227 In one sense, Justice Kennedy utilizes this realm of inquiry as a
way of building upon the readers’ fears as to what happens to the unborn
in these cases. Sprinkled throughout Part I, for instance, are examples
of what “some doctors” do; what “others” chose to do and what “may”
occur as a result.228 This epistemological construction technique creates
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Id. at 138–39 (emphasis added).
See id. at 134–45.
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fear, both in the terms of increasing distrust of physicians given the variety of medical uncertainty involved in the procedure and with respect
to how the fetuses are treated (some may be “torn apart” others “killed
a few days before” to make the process easier, and still others have their
“brains sucked out”).229 In the second sense, Justice Kennedy uses epistemology to discuss all the alternative procedures that fall outside the
scope of the 2003 Act.230 Unlike the first sense, the purpose here is not
fear but reassurance. By discussing how many other procedures are
available to women, readers are more likely to except this single prohibition as an appropriate measure. In other words, he is saying “look, this
act really won’t have as big effect as you all think, and given how horrendous it is, we should ban it anyway.”
For many readers trying to reconcile their personal views with
the rights of women to access these services, this shocking presentation,
viewed in light of the infinite variables at play, make physicians’ arguments harder to digest and accept. Yet this may very well be exactly
what Kennedy had in mind. In other words, by “humanizing” the fetus,
Kennedy fully expects readers (or, more importantly, his colleagues) to
have a harder time sympathizing with physicians on any “moral,” philosophical, or even “spiritual level.” He thus implicitly frames the issue
in Carhart as a struggle between humanized fetuses facing gruesome
deaths at the hands of inhumane physicians.231
Justice Kennedy compliments the above referenced rhetoric
with his familiar paternalistic approach in Part IV of his opinion. After
laying out Act’s language in full detail and articulating the applicable
standard, Kennedy hones in on these pragmatic concerns. He does so,
however, not at the “undue burden” stage but in his discussion of the
“government’s interest” in banned “intact D & E’s.” Here, he begins
with the pertinent State interests:
There can be no doubt the government “has an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession,” and “[an] interest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy.232
Kennedy next dives unashamedly into homily on the deep and
dark nature of decisions concerning abortion and how the 2003 Act
229

Id. Another example is the variety of drugs which may be used depending on the stage of
the pregnancy, the level of dilation achieved and various other factors. Id.
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Justice Kennedy utilizes this approach throughout Part I, for example, by mentioning the
traditional D & E procedure in the beginning and other second-trimester procedures towards the
end. See generally id.
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majority opinion. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
232
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157, 163.
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serves to “protect” both women and, perhaps more important to Kennedy, the fetuses:
No one would dispute that, for many, D & E is a procedure itself
laden with the power to devalue human life.233
[I]t seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.234
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice
to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know:
that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form.235
Kennedy employs two parallel rhetorical devices all three
phrases. First, he sets up the epistemic framework by affirming the veracity of each proposition at the beginning of the statement (underlined
above).236 These self-serving phrases (“No one would dispute” and “It
is self-evident”) lure readers into accepting the proposition before it has
even been presented.237 He then hooks the reader in with emotionally
sobering language (in italics) that mixes his “human narrative” with a
more concerning “religious supernatural” tone (“devalue[ing] human
life,” leads to a “struggle with grief” and “anguish and sorrow”).238 No
longer does the struggle relate to Kennedy’s personal battle between
liberty and personal belief (he clearly opposes this specific type of abortion regardless of women’s rights) but rather frames it as woman’s internal conflict in dealing with the consequences of her decision (“some
come to regret their decision”). Kennedy beats the reader over the head
with this rhetoric eventually tying it into the overall legal basis for upholding The Act:
[Because]…Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression
in the bond of love the mother has for her child.
[Because]…Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and
painful moral decision.
[Because]…In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the
means that will be used[.]
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Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
Id. at 159–60.
See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162, 164 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162, 164 and accompanying text.
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[Then it follows that]…The State has an interest in ensuring so
grave a choice is well informed. 239
These passages relate to Kennedy’s Catholicism in several ways.
First, given our reading of Akron and Casey, it is safe to say that Kennedy’s language reveals his own moral leanings on the issue of abortion,
and in particular to this specific form of abortion.240 This type of vivid
explanation, for example, is totally absent from Breyer’s majority opinion in Stenberg where the Court struck down the “partial-birth abortion”
statute. 241 Although Kennedy exposed the reality of these procedures
in his dissent in Stenberg, he made them the center of attention in Carhart v. Gonzales.242 In addition, the level of rhetoric devoted to painting
the case as a moral issue with such “grave” and “profound” implications
suggests that this moral aversion to the procedure has deeper roots in
Kennedy’s Catholicism. Just in prior cases, one can read Kennedy’s language as revealing his own moral agenda, which, in turn, is influenced
by his religious beliefs. In this sense, Kennedy has increasingly emphasized the moral [and religious] dimensions of abortion cases to vote
more and more in line with the Court’s conservative block and chip
away at Roe in the process.
CONCLUSION
During his thirty-year tenure on the Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy developed a unique moral flavor to writing judicial opinions; an
approach which compliments his larger liberty-based approach to deciding cases.243 As this article has attempted to demonstrate, this progression is evinced by Kennedy’s more publicized opinion concerning
abortion: Akron, Casey, and Carhart.244 In addition, however, this article
argues that Kennedy’s religious views influenced his opinion writing
process in those landmark cases.245 With Blackmun papers as the starting point, we know that Kennedy intentionally wrote to convey his own
moral “struggles” on this sensitive issue.246 In addition, the three cases
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See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added).
See supra Parts III-IV.
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See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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550 U.S. 124 (2007).
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Andrew Nolan et al., Justice Kennedy: His Jurisprudence and the Future of the Court,
CONG. RES. SERV. (July 11, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45256.pdf.
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See supra Part III-V.
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See supra Part I.
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See supra Part IV-B.
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discussed show how Kennedy grew more confident in exposing his personal leanings with each divisive opinion.247 Finally, based on what we
gleaned regarding Kennedy’s religious beliefs and his personal views
on abortion, we can safely infer that these “moral” pronouncements are
to some degree influenced by his Catholic background.248 To be sure,
we may never know conclusively whether Justice Kennedy’s Catholicism “made the difference” in any of these cases. However, there is little
doubt that it influenced his judicial writing process.
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See supra Part III-V.
See supra Part I.

